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PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST CENSORSHIP: THE LAW
AFTER FW/PBS, INC V. CITY OF DALLAS
Despite the Constitution's broad first amendment directive to "make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"' govern-
mental entities continually search for new methods to regulate speech,
particularly in the area of adult entertainment businesses.2 In FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas,3 however, the Supreme Court held that a licensing
scheme, in a comprehensive city ordinance regulating sexually oriented
businesses, was a prior restraint4 failing to provide adequate procedural
safeguards. Even though the Court attained a six-vote majority on the
unconstitutionality of the licensing scheme,5 it was unable to agree upon
1. U.S. CoNST. amend I.
2. For example, in San Francisco the local government enacted "porn zoning" laws to cope
with urban blight caused by adult businesses. The California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance,
but found that a single showing of a pornographic film was not enough to bring the theater under the
law. Rather, when sex movies account for a "substantial portion" of either the total films shown or
the revenue, the city may zone the theater. L.A. Times, June 30, 1989, part 1, at 3, col. 5. In
Delaware, the state enacted the Delaware Adult Entertainment Establishment Act, a comprehensive
scheme for licensing adult entertainment businesses. The purpose of the act, according to the legisla-
ture, was to reduce and prevent obscenity and prostitution, which are facilitated by the abuse of
legitimate occupations such as adult entertainment businesses. 56 U.S.L.W. 2403 (Jan. 26 1988).
For other examples of specific government attempts to regulate adult businesses, see infra notes 12-
16, 22-28, 46 and accompanying text.
3. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990).
4. The doctrine of prior restraint is generally used to deter any form of government action
tending to suppress acts of expression instead of punishing them after publication through civil or
criminal sanctions. The doctrine presumes that any prior restraint of expression is unconstitutional.
There are two types of prior restraints: 1) a government order or court injunction that prevents a
person from engaging in certain kinds of communications, see, eg., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 701-02 (1931); and 2) a rule or ordinance that requires a license or permit before one may
engage in a particular type of expression, see, eg., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 50 (1965).
For more information concerning prior restraints, see generally Abrams, Prior Restraints, Com-
munications Law, PLI Order No. G4-3839, Nov. 9, 1989; Scordato, Distinction Without a Differ-
ence: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 59 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1989); Ideological
Exclusions: A Prior Restraint Analysis, 1I COM. ENT. 335 (1989); Restraining Prior Restraint, or a
Call for Balancing in Evaluating Obscenity Abatement Statutes: City of Paducah v. Investment En-
tertainment, Inc. 791 F.2d 463, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 181 (1987); Arenson, Prior Restraint: A Rational
Doctrine or an Elusive Compendium of Hackneyed Cliches?, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 265 (1986-87);
Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
439 (1987); Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. Rav. 11
(1981); Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA.
L. REv. 53 (1984); Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
5. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined; Justice
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a single standard for judging the procedural safeguards, thus setting the
stage for inconsistency and confusion among the lower courts.
The seminal case establishing procedural protections against prior re-
straints is Freedman v. Maryland.6 In Freedman, the Supreme Court
held that "a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of
a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censor-
ship system."7 The Court mandated three procedural safeguards against
such prior restraints.' First, the burden of proving that the film is unpro-
tected expression must rest on the censor.9 Second, any restraint issued
Brennan wrote an opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Marshall joined. Justice Scalia wrote a
dissenting opinion and Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented. This Recent
Development and the FW/PBS Inc. opinion focus solely on conduct protected under the first
amendment.
6. 380 U.S. 50 (1965).
7. Id. at 58.
8. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58, 59. Several commentators have focused on various aspects of the
Freedman decision. See Constitutional Law-Freedom of Expression-Permissive Bounds of Prior
Restraint of Movies, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 597 (1968) (looks primarily at prior restraint as constitu-
tional doctrine and specifically in Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) and Freedman);
Klein, Film Censorship: The American and British Experience, 12 VILL. L. REV. 419 (1967) (exten-
sive general overview of the history of film censorship); Recent Development, Freedman v. Mary-
land, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1832 (1966) (censorship practices of the United States Customs Officials in
light of Freedman safeguards); Motion Picture Censorship and the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 3
Hous. L. REv. 11 (1965) (review of censorship in the motion picture industry, traces history of prior
restraint doctrine and analyzes effects of Freedman); Recent Development, Freedman v. Maryland,
10 ST. LOUIS U.L.J., 142 (1965) (discusses Freedman as a logical extension of earlier prior restraint
doctrine).
The Freedman decision also provided guidelines for numerous cases involving the first amend-
ment and adult entertainment. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
(administrative board's procedure failed to include Freedman safeguards); In re Search of Kitty's
East, 905 F.2d 1367, 1372 (10th Cir. 1990) (district court properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction
according to Freedman); Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.) (anti-nude dancing
statute is an unconstitutional prior restraint), cert. granted sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
111 S. Ct. 38 (1990); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d
1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) (requiring dial-a-porn service to be prosecuted under existing obscenity
laws or through a prior review permit system that satisfies Freedman), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029
(1988); BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1986) (overbroad anti-nude dancing
ordinance violates Freedman test).
9. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58 ("Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due pro-
cess certainly requires... that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants
engaged in criminal speech") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). The Court expressed
concern that the obstacles involved in appealing a decision would be too great. Id. at 59. The
exhibitor would not appeal because his stake in any one film would not be great enough to warrant
the time and expense. Id. The distributor would not appeal an adverse decision because his ability
to show the film anywhere else in the country would outweigh the burdens and delays of litigation
necessary to show a film in Maryland.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/17
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in advance of a final judicial determination must do no more than pre-
serve the status quo for the shortest feasible period. 0 Third, the proce-
dure must provide for a prompt final judicial decision. I1
Freedman involved a Maryland law12 requiring all motion picture ex-
hibitors to submit fims to the State Board of Censors before showing the
films.' 3 The statute created an invalid prior restraint on a protected form
of expression 14 because the initial decision of the Board of Censors effec-
10. Id. The Court held that, in effect, the statute endowed the Board's decision with finality.
Prior case law states that the only method that properly insures protection of the freedom of expres-
sion is a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding. Based on this precedent, the Freedman
Court stated that only a procedure providing for judicial determination would be sufficient to impose
a valid final restraint. Id. at 58. See A Quantity of Books v. State of Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)
(statute that failed to provide a pre-seizure hearing on the question of whether books were obscene
was held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963) (Rhode Island statute that enabled a commission to determine whether published matter was
obscenity was an intolerable restraint because there was no judicial supervision of the commission's
findings); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (decision by the judicial officer of the
Post Office Department, which disallowed certain mailings that it determined were obscene, was
held impermissible to the extent that it depended on a determination that the magazines were ob-
scene); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (Missouri statute that permitted judge to
issue search warrants authorizing police to search for and seize obscene material before any hearing
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
11. The prompt judicial review would guard against both an administrative refusal to grant the
license even after the expiration of a temporary restraint and the deterrent effect of an errant tempo-
rary denial of a license. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
The Court provided what it believed to be an example of acceptable procedural safeguards in a
statutory scheme. The Court explained a New York procedure for preventing the sale of obscene
books: "That procedure postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determination of obscen-
ity following notice and an adversary hearing. The statute provides for a hearing one day after
joinder of issue; the judge must hand down his decision within two days after termination of the
hearing." Id. at 60 (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1957) provides:
It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit or use any motion picture film or view in the
State of Maryland unless the said film or view has been submitted by the exchange, owner
or lessee of the film or view and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State Board
of Censors, hereinafter in this article called the Board.
13. A Baltimore theater owner challenged the statute by exhibiting the film, "Revenge at Day-
break" without first submitting it to the censorship board. The state conceded that the film did not
violate the statutory standards and would have been approved had it been submitted. Freedman,
380 U.S. at 52.
14. Since its decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court has upheld the
distinction between pornography and obscenity. The first amendment protects the former but not
the latter, and, thus, the states may regulate obscenity. The Court enunciated a three-part test in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), to determine what material qualifies as obscene:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tively barred exhibition of any disapproved film"5 and the exhibitor's sole
recourse was a successful appeal to a Maryland court. 16
In subsequent applications of the Freedman test, the Court has
demonstrated great suspicion for any system of prior restraint.' 7 Specifi-
cally, the Court strikes down two types of prior restraints18 on constitu-
tionally protected freedoms: 9 1) a prior restraint that allows for
unbridled discretion on the part of a government official or agency;2" and
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. For a recent look at the first amendment and obscenity, see RICO v. Dealers in Obscene
Matter: The First Amendment Battle, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 71 (1988); Dial-a-Porn and the
FirstAmendment The State Action Loophole, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 267 (1988); Constitutional Law.
Taking A Soft Look at Probable Cause An Obscene Result for First Amendment Protections, 7 Loy.
ENT. L.J. 111 (1987); First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Child Pornography, Obscene or Not,
Possesses No First Amendment Protection, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 675 (1984).
15. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 54.
16. The theater owner's challenge to the statute differed from past challenges to similar obscen-
ity statutes because it focused on the procedures of censorship and their effect on protected expres-
sion. Id.
The Maryland law did not impose any time limits on the board for its review of the film. See
supra note 13. If the board disapproved of the film, the exhibitor could appeal the decision and the
same board would re-examine the film in the presence of the exhibitor. MA. ANN. CODE art. 66A,
§ 19 (1957). Upon approval or disapproval, the exhibitor could appeal the board's decision to the
Baltimore City Court, and then to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Id.
17. "While prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se... [a]ny system of prior restraint
... comes to [the Supreme Court] bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."
110 S. Ct. 596, 604 (1990) (citing Southeastern Promotion, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 558). See also, Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (city ordinance making it illegal to participate in
any parade, procession, or other public demonstration held to be illegal prior restraint); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (Rhode Island law that failed to provide for judicial
determination of Morality Commission's determinations was an unconstitutional prior restraint).
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (New Hampshire statute requiring persons to obtain a
license before engaging in a parade or procession held an unconstitutional prior restraint); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Connecticut statute that prohibited solicitation of money for
charitable, religious, or philanthropic reasons without approval of the Public Welfare Office, and
that allowed the Office to determine whether the applicant was bona fide, violated the fourteenth
amendment); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (city ordinance requiring permit to distribute
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature was an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of
the press).
18. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 605.
20. Id. Justice O'Connor quoted Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 605 ("It is settled by a long line of
recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms
which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requir-
ing a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms"). See Lake-
wood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (city ordinance giving mayor unbridled
discretion over whether to grant annual permits for newsracks was unconstitutional); Secretary of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/17
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2) a scheme that fails to limit the time within which the decision maker
must issue the license.21
In FW/PBS 22 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 946 (1984) (statute that restricted the percentage of chari-
table fund-raising expenses was overbroad and therefore unconstitutionally limited first amendment
solicitation activities of charities); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (Maryland statute that
provided for review of films by censorship committee before films could be shown lacked procedural
safeguards and was therefore an unconstitutional infringement on film shower's rights); Cox v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (when highest police officials told defendant he could picket, it was due
process violation to convict defendant for picketing); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)
(city ordinance giving mayor discretion to grant solicitation permits without any controlling guide-
lines was unconstitutional); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (city ordinance that required
people to obtain a permit before holding public worship meetings was unconstitutional because it
gave control over the right to speak to city officials without providing appropriate standards);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (in the abscence of narrowly drawn standards, statutes
that make it unlawful to speak in public places without the prior consent of public officials are
unconstitutional); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (ordinance requiring permit before use of
sound amplification equipment unlawful where no procedural protections for granting permit).
21. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 605 (citing Freedman, 280 U.S. at 59; Vance v. Universal Amuse-
ment Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 (1980) (statute that restrained speech for indefinite period held invalid)).
Justice O'Connor compared the censorship system in Freedman to a licensing scheme and found
both situations created the possibility of an unconstitutional suppression of protected speech if the
city failed to institute adequate procedural safeguards.
22. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). In FWIPBS the Dallas City Council enacted an ordinance regulat-
ing sexually oriented businesses. Id. The purpose of the ordinance was to eradicate the secondary
effects of crime and urban blight. Id. A sexually oriented business was defined as "an adult arcade,
adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult
theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter center." DALLAS, TEx., CrrY CODE
ch. 41A, Sexually Oriented Businesses § 41A-2(19) (1986). Suits were brought challenging the ordi-
nance by three "groups of individuals and businesses: those involved in selling, exhibiting, or distrib-
uting publications, video or motion fims; adult cabarets, or establishments providing live nude
dancing or films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides or other photographic reproductions depict-
ing sexual activities and anatomy specified in the ordinance; and adult motel owners." Id. at 605.
The district court upheld most of the ordinance in Dumas v. Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex.
1986), striking only four subsections. The district court cited Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969), and found §§ 41A-5(aX8) and 41A-5(c) invalid because they vested over-
broad discretion in the chief of police. In addition, the court cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), in striking down a provision that imposed civil disability on the basis of an indictment or
information, because less restrictive alternatives were available to the city. Id. The court also elimi-
nated five crimes from the list of those giving rise to civil disability because they were not sufficiently
related to the ordinance's purpose. Subsequently, the city amended the ordinance to conform to the
district court's opinion. Id.
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, viewing the ordinance as content-neutral
with regard to time, place, and manner of regulation. Id. Furthermore, the court concluded that
the Freedman procedural safeguards were not necessary in the regulation of an ongoing commercial
business. Id. The sections of the court's opinion that address whether adult motel owners who rent
rooms for less than ten hours must obtain a license and whether the civil disability provisions are
valid, are outside the scope of this Recent Development.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Dallas city ordinance at issue did not meet Freedman's procedural
safeguards."3 The ordinance required sexually oriented businesses to
submit to an inspection before obtaining a license, whenever the business
moved into a new building, the use of the structure changed, the owner-
ship of the business changed, or when the business applied for its annual
permit.24 The chief of police must approve the issuance of the license
within thirty days of receipt of the application,2" but the permit could not
issue before the health department, fire department, and the building offi-
cial approved the premises.26 The ordinance neither set a time limit
within which these inspections had to occur,27 nor provided a means of
recourse for the applicants if the license was not issued within the thirty
day framework.28
Because the prior restraint lacked the procedural safeguard of a time
limit, Justice O'Connor found the Dallas ordinance unconstitutional.
29
Nevertheless, O'Connor concluded that the regulatory scheme did not
23. 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990). Justice O'Connor noted that although facial challenges to legislation
are generally disfavored, they are acceptable in the first amendment context when legislation permits
unbridled discretion by the decisionmaker and when the legislation is challenged as overbroad.
FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 603. See also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 &
n.15 (1984).
The city argued that the ordinance requires every business, regardless of whether it is protected by
the first amendment, to obtain a certificate of occupancy when it moves into a new location or the
use of the structure changes. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 604. Indeed, the ordinance applied to some
businesses that were not protected by the first amendment: for example, escort agencies and sexual
encounter centers. Id. However, because the ordinance was specifically targeted to businesses that
provided sexually explicit speech and therefore received first amendment protection, the city con-
ceded, for purposes of the case, that the businesses were engaged in protected conduct. Id. Cf.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (bookstore); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (live theater performances are protected conduct); Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (motion picture theaters showing adult films are protected); Sehad
v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude dancing is protected conduct).
Many ordinances that attempt to regulate adult businesses do so through zoning. In Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986) the Court held that a munic-
ipal zoning ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters from being within 1,000 feet of a residential
area, church, park, or school did not violate the first amendment. The Court stated that the ordi-
nance was aimed at theaters and their secondary effects, and not at the contents of any particular
expression or speech. Id.
24. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 604. Businesses that were not sexually oriented had to obtain
licenses, but only when they moved into a new structure or when the use of the structure changed.
Id.
25. DALLAS, TEx., CITY CODE ch. 41A, Sexually Oriented Businesses § 41A-5(a)(6) (1986).
26. Id.
27. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 605.
28. Id.
29. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 606. See supra note 22.
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present the "grave 'dangers of a censorship system,'" and, therefore, was
not subject to the full protections of Freedman .30 According to Justice
O'Connor, Freedman's underlying policy provides that a license for a
business protected by the first amendment must issue within a reasonable
period of time, because undue delay suppresses protected speech. 1
O'Connor distinguished the ordinance in Freedman from the Dallas
ordinance in two ways to find that the Dallas ordinance had to satisfy the
second 32 and third3 3 prongs of the Freedman test, but that the city did
not have to bear the burden of proving the speech was unprotected.34
First, the censor in Freedman engaged in direct censorship of particular
expressive material. Such regulation is presumptively invalid, 3 and
therefore requires the censor to bear the burden of justifying its actions.36
In contrast, Dallas did not review the content of or exercise discretion
over particular expressive speech; instead, the city examined each license
applicant's overall qualifications.3 7 Justice O'Connor deemed that this
"ministerial action" is not presumptively invalid.3 8
Second, in Freedman, the obstacles to litigating or appealing an ad-
verse decision by the censor were so great that a censor's refusal was
tantamount to complete suppression of speech.39 In Dallas, however, the
applicant had more at stake, because the temporary restriction on speech
threatened the applicant's entire livelihood, not merely one movie.4°
Therefore, O'Connor posited that the Dallas licensing procedure would
not deter applicants from appealing a license denial in the courts. 41
Although Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in FW/PBS, he
disagreed with O'Connor's refusal to apply all three prongs of the Freed-
man test. Justice Brennan argued that the procedural protections guar-
30. Id. (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58).
31. FW/PBS, IlOS. Ct. at 606.
32. See supra text accompanying note 10.
33. See supra text accompanying note 11.
34. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 607. O'Connor stated: "[L]imitation on the time within which the
licensor must issue the license as well as the availability of prompt judicial review satisfy the 'princi-
ple that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.'" Id. (citing
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963)).
35. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 606-07.
36. Id. at 607.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
1991] 1005
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anteed by Freedman do not vary with the facts of each case.42 Rather,
all three parts of Freedman always must be satisfied.
Brennan stressed that the Court has never suggested that the Freed-
man procedural protections vary with the particular facts of the prior
restraint.43  In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, Inc.,4 the
Supreme Court applied all the Freedman procedural protections to a iI-
censing scheme requiring only professional fundraisers to wait for a de-
termination on their application to solicit.45 The regulation did not
provide for a specified period of time in which the licensor had to issue
the license.46 The Court therefore found the regulation unconstitutional
because the indefinite delay compelled the speaker's silence.47
Justice Brennan found the ordinance in Riley indistinguishable from
the Dallas ordinance.4 First, the Dallas decisionmaker reviewed the en-
tire business, not the content of any particular expression.49 Similarly, in
Riley, the decisionmaker reviewed applications to practice a profession,
not the particular content of a solicitation.50 Second, in both cases the
42. Id. at 612.
43. Id. See Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (Court struck down a motion
picture ordinance that failed to provide adequate procedural protections under Freedman); Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (Court invalidated postal rules that permitted restrictions on the use of
the mails for allegedly obscene materials for not meeting the Freedman standards); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (the Court invalidated a city's refusal to rent
municipal facilities for a musical because of its content).
Justice Brennan specifically addressed two cases. In National Socialist Party of America v. Sko-
kie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a court-ordered injunction must be stayed if
appellate review is not expedited. Furthermore, in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S.
308 (1980), the Court invalidated a statute that prohibited for one year the showing of films based on
the fact that the same theater had previously shown obscene films. The Court stated that such a
determination must follow Freedman procedures.
44. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
45. Id. at 801. The North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act controls professional fun-
draisers. It defines the reasonable fee a professional fundraiser may charge as a percentage of the
gross revenue solicited, requires professional fundralsers to disclose to potential donors the gross
percentage of revenues retained in prior charitable solicitations, and requires professional fundraisers
to obtain a license before engaging in solicitation. Riley, 487 U.S. at 784. The statute allowed
volunteer fundraisers to solicit immediately upon submitting an application, but prohibited profes-
sional solicitors from fundraising until their application was approved. Id. at 801. The Court found
the statute unconstitutional because it did not set a time limit during which the license must issue.
Id.
46. Id. at 801.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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delay created by the regulatory scheme threatened the applicant's liveli-
hood.51 In Riley, however, the court placed the burden of appealing to
the courts on the State, not the applicant.
5 2
The even split in the Court deeply affects the previously clear and uni-
formly applied Freedman protections.5" The split creates confusion as to
which standard the Court will follow in the future. Lower courts are left
to determine whether the Court will remain with the traditional ap-
proach articulated by Justice Brennan,54 or will choose to follow Justice
O'Connor's novel approach of dividing the Freedman protections.55
Justice Brennan's inflexible approach of applying all three Freedman
prongs in any prior restraint situation greatly expands procedural protec-
tions against prior restraints. Thus, even when a fact pattern arises that
does not warrant such protections, the lower court must still employ
them. Conversely, Justice O'Connor's approach severely restricts the
procedural safeguards against prior restraints. The absence of one of the
three Freedman safeguards gives censors an advantage over those whom
they censor. Moreover, lower courts will have to determine which of the
Freedman safeguards are necessary to provide licensees adequate proce-
dural protection: a regulation may need only expedient judicial review,
but not a time restriction; or only a time restriction, but no avenue for
immediate review.
If lower courts adopt Justice O'Connor's approach, the deci-
sionmaker's initial ruling possibly will stand until the applicant appeals.
Consequently, the initial ruling silences the applicant during the interim
period. While judicial relief may come swiftly and the period of silence
may be negligible, the result is still suppression of protected expression.
In the words of Justice Brennan, "In distributing the burdens of initiat-
ing judicial proceedings and proof, we are obliged to place them such
that we err, if we must, on the side of speech, not on the side of
silence." 6
Carol Lynne Stanton
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
56. FW/PBS, 110 S. Ct. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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